» » America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Modern War Studies)

eBook America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Modern War Studies) epub

by Peter J. Schifferle

eBook America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Modern War Studies) epub
  • ISBN: 0700617140
  • Author: Peter J. Schifferle
  • Genre: History
  • Subcategory: Americas
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: University Press of Kansas (April 5, 2010)
  • Pages: 308 pages
  • ePUB size: 1729 kb
  • FB2 size 1260 kb
  • Formats doc txt azw rtf


Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an. .Peter S. Kindsvater, Journal of American History, March 2011.

Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries. Crucial to that preparation were the army schools at Fort Leavenworth. Interwar Army officers. The result is a well-reasoned, balanced study that is also a pleasure to read. Military professoinals, historians and policymakers will find it a helpful guide to a historic, successful officer education process.

America's School for War book. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read

America's School for War book. Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. Start by marking America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II as Want to Read: Want to Read savin. ant to Read.

A brilliant examination of the influence of the Leavenworth schools on the conduct of American forces in World War II. A brilliant examination of the influence of the Leavenworth schools on the conduct of American forces in World War II.

Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award

Army Historical Foundation Distinguished Writing Award. Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries.

by Peter J. Schifferle. Series: Modern War Studies (2010). Army struggled with the logistics of millions of men in World War I, and then created professional training on a division level that helped win World War II, with a history of the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, 1918-1945.

Rather than serve up the leisurely, ultraconservative institution often portrayed, he presents an officer corps grappling with an uncertain future in a time of fiscal austerity that-even in today's officers can only imagine.

America's School for War : Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II. by Peter J.

General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth from 1979 to 1981, that a second year of military education was needed for select officers . America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II. Modern War Studies. University Press of Kansas. After receiving final approval, Wass de Czege helped plan and develop the school, which would open in mid-1983. Although there was some disagreement about the purpose of the course, army leaders and the course designers. settled on a plan to provide officers with a "broad, deep military education in the science and art of wa.

I’ve been reading Peter Schifferle’s America’s School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education and Victory in World War II. Generally I found it kind of dull, feeling a bit like a biography written only about what a person did between 9 and 5 every day. That said, I wa. That said, I was intrigued and persuaded by his basic. February 1, 2012, 9:23 AM.

When the United States entered World War II, it took more than industrial might to transform its tiny army--smaller than even Portugal's--into an overseas fighting force of more than eight and a half million. Peter Schifferle contends that the determination of American army officers to be prepared for the next big war was an essential component in America's ultimate triumph over its adversaries. Crucial to that preparation were the army schools at Fort Leavenworth. Interwar Army officers, haunted by the bloodshed of World War I's Meuse-Argonne Offensive, fully expected to return to Europe to conclude the "unfinished business" of that conflict, and they prepared well. Schifferle examines for the first time precisely how they accomplished this through a close and illuminating look at the students, faculty, curriculum, and essential methods of instruction at Fort Leavenworth. He describes how the interwar officer corps there translated the experiences of World War I into effective doctrine, engaged in intellectual debate on professional issues, conducted experiments to determine the viability of new concepts, and used military professional education courses to substitute for the experience of commanding properly organized and resourced units. Schifferle highlights essential elements of war preparation that only the Fort Leavenworth education could provide, including intensive instruction in general staff procedures, hands-on experience with the principles and techniques of combined arms, and the handling of large division-sized formations in combat. This readied army officers for an emerging new era of global warfare and enabled them to develop the leadership decision making they would need to be successful on the battlefield. But Schifferle offers more than a recitation of curriculum development through the skillful interweaving of personal stories about both school experiences and combat operations, collectively recounting the human and professional development of the officer corps from 1918 to 1945. Well crafted and insightful, Schifferle's meticulously researched study shows how and why the Fort Leavenworth experience was instrumental in producing that impressive contingent of military officers who led the U.S. Army to final victory in World War II. By the end of the book, the attentive reader will also fully comprehend why the military professionals at Fort Leavenworth have come to think of it as the "Intellectual Center of the Army." This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.
Comments: (7)
Maridor
LtCol (ret) Pete Shifferle, Ph.D., has produced an outstanding history of the Army's Command and General Staff School. His work focuses on the post-WWI through WWII period of the staff school (later the US Army Command and General Staff College). I like the author's methodology. He follows the development of the educational process for our WWII leadership and the problems encountered by the Army in its attempt to design the "just right" answer to educating under a variety of changing situations. While many who are familiar with the history of the staff school know about the two-year course implemented between the wars, Schifferle explains the reasons for the return to the one-year course due to the arrival of the WWI "hump" --- the mass of officers commissioned in 1917-1918. The Army's leaders and the school faculty faced some of the same problems as WWII broke that we face today. The massive problem of how to adequately staff an expanding Army with educated officers caused the Army to go from a two year course to a 90 day course with significant educational trade-offs. Schifferle does a superlative job of analyzing what this meant to units in the field by translating the numbers of Leavenworth graduates to unit positions in the field. What Schifferle finds is that Leavenworth could not keep pace with the demands of a hugely expanding Army without an attendant loss of graduates' quality and the requisite numbers to fill all key staff and command positions. These problems are being experienced by the Army today that finds all majors attending the course, many only taking the four months of core instruction at campuses located at Fort Belvoir, Fort Lee, Fort Gordon, and Redstone Arsenal. The war-time footing and requirement to fill numerous positions with Leavenworth educated officers has also resulted in the dissolution of selection for attendance. Until three years ago, selection for Leavenworth attendance was seen as a quality-cut, much as it was prior to WWII. However, exigencies of constant rotations of units to active theaters is causing problems such as the Army experienced in WWII. What is different however, is that the faculty, unlike that of WWII, is relatively stable since 70% is now largely composed of retired officers. Unlike the turmoil of 1944 where instructional staff was only assigned for an average of 13 months, many retired instructors remain for several years. Quality of instruction is enhanced since instructors have time to become subject-matter-experts. Since the staff college is instructing problem solving for larger units and not small unit techniques and procedures, field currency is not as important although it is desirable. The 30% active duty faculty fills this gap. Shifferle has added to the body of knowledge of military art and science with his commendable effort. I highly recommend his book for professional officers of all ranks.
Doulkree
I was very pleased to see my copy of Dr. Schifferle's work arrive. First, I note that the author has outstanding credentials for this topic. Here, the biographical information is understated for the general reader, but speaks volumes for people who know anything about the School of Advanced Military Studies. Clearly, Dr. Schifferle is an accomplished historian and an expert in his field. Second, I appreciate both the bibliography and footnotes; I used both to gain insight into the scope and depth of the author's research. For example, I surveyed the sources that he used for the discussion on doctrinal development in the 1920's and found that material to be very interesting, to include the origins of the FM 100-5 manuals most professionals are so familiar with. Third, the text is well written prose with excellent analytical structure and substantive support for his arguments. In essense, I learned a lot about the Army as a "learning institution" in the inter-war years, showing the intellectual growth of officer corps as a whole (as opposed to the "intellectual leaders" that we so frequently read about). This book gave me a deeper appreciation for the relationships between experience (i.e. WWI), a flowering intellectual discourse (i.e. in professional journals), experimentation leading to new theory, resulting in new doctrine disseminated through the school system, and subsequently adjusted by new experience (i.e. WWII). This book clearly demonstrates the value of professional military education, illustrating many important concepts and innovations that reached fruition in WWII.
GawelleN
Most credit for the US performance in World War II has been given to material production and US's incredible industrial might, "the Arsenal of Democracy." However, the US would not have been able to mobilize and organize this effort towards strategic ends if it hadn't been for competent and confident staff work and leadership. World War I had a profound impact on the officers who lived through it and they were determined to see future generations better prepared. Their efforts were constrained by post-war drawdowns that made traditional readiness impossible. The Army rarely had the funds to maneuver units larger than regiments, and even those were infrequent. The Army conducted experiments with motorization and mechanization, but also to a very small extent. When war came, the Army expanded from 200,000 soldiers to 8.3 million, and from 14,000 officers to 600,000. Moreover, this was a period of technological and doctrinal turmoil, with rapid advances in everything from armor to aircraft, with commensurate prophesies about how each would revolutionize warfare. Yet when American soldiers entered the war, they defeated their seasoned opponents regularly and American leaders were already familiar with fighting maneuver warfare. The schools at Fort Leavenworth played a key role in America's readiness, keeping doctrine focused on fundamentals, while nurturing vigorous and open debate among all grades of officers. The education focused on problem solving, fundamentals principles, and building confidence, while avoiding fixation on rote learning or single-best "school solutions." This formed a culture across the Army (and other services who participated) of collaboration, innovation and problem solving.

This is a book leaders in the American military services need to be reading right now.
eBooks Related to America's School for War: Fort Leavenworth, Officer Education, and Victory in World War II (Modern War Studies)
Contacts | Privacy Policy | DMCA
All rights reserved.
lycee-pablo-picasso.fr © 2016-2020