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eBook Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (Military Research Paper) (Military Research Papers) (Military Research Papers) epub

by Gregory Hooker

eBook Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom (Military Research Paper) (Military Research Papers) (Military Research Papers) epub
  • ISBN: 0944029981
  • Author: Gregory Hooker
  • Genre: Other
  • Subcategory: Humanities
  • Language: English
  • Publisher: Washington Institute for Near East Policy; Revised ed. edition (July 11, 2005)
  • Pages: 114 pages
  • ePUB size: 1968 kb
  • FB2 size 1480 kb
  • Formats txt mbr mobi lrf


Hooker, senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at .

Details (if other): Cancel. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Hooker, senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at . Central Command, provides a detailed narrative of the war planning process, beginning with the military's initial attempts to adjust to the new focus on regime change and closing with the government's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment.

Intelligence processes for supporting deliberate military planning have become relatively standardized over the years.

Published May 30, 2005 by Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Iraq War, 2003-2011, Military intelligence. Intelligence processes for supporting deliberate military planning have become relatively standardized over the.

Deciding on Military Intervention: What is the Role of Senior Military Leaders?

Deciding on Military Intervention: What is the Role of Senior Military Leaders? J Garofano. Victory in war: Foundations of modern military policy. For millennia, policymakers and statesmen have grappled with questions about the concept of victory in war. How long does it take to achieve victory and how do we know when victory is achieved? And, as highlighted by the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq, is it possible to win a war and yet lose the peace?

Foreign Policy Objective Control Military Operation Moral Courage Military Leader. Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005).

Foreign Policy Objective Control Military Operation Moral Courage Military Leader. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves. 19. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 22. oogle Scholar. 20. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), p. 26.

Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, spanning the military's initial attempts to refocus on regime change and the government's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment. Throughout, he describes specific prewar intelligence estimates and assesses their accuracy.

book by Gregory Hooker. The aftermath of the war in Iraq has generated a great deal of second-guessing about Washington’s prewar planning and intelligence efforts. Hooker had a ringside seat for Operation Iraqi Freedom planning as senior intelligence analyst at . Central Command (CENTCOM) where he has worked since 1996. This job made him aware that military policy, particularly the Pentagon's desire to fight a fast war in keeping with the theories of military transformation, militated against a deeper understanding of the potential for an Iraqi insurgency.

Military schooling often requires strategic examination of past battles and current military strategy.

This qualitative study investigated Iraqi children's experiences of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the meaning it had for them given their cultural context. This qualitative study investigated Iraqi children's experiences of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the meaning it had for them given their cultural context. Two focus groups were employed in Mosul, Iraq, to interview 12 children between the ages of 9 and 13. They elaborated on the drawings and letters that pertained to their war experiences.

Gregory Hooker is the senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at CENTCOM He holds a master's degree in strategic intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College.

Gregory Hooker is the senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at CENTCOM. He has worked extensively in Iraq, most recently helping to establish the National Intelligence Center in Baghdad. He holds a master's degree in strategic intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College. Defense & Security.

Operation Iraqi Freedom documents are some 48,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes that were discovered by the . military during the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The documents date from the 1980s through the post-Saddam period. In March 2006, the .

The aftermath of the war in Iraq has generated a great deal of second-guessing about Washingtons prewar planning and intelligence efforts. Largely missing from this debate has been a thorough examination of military intelligence efforts outside Washington. In this study, Gregory Hooker provides a detailed narrative of the war planning process, spanning the militarys initial attempts to refocus on regime change and the governments ineffective preparation for the postwar environment. Throughout, he assesses the prewar intelligence estimates and the various problems that U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had to overcome, including rampant media leaks, unrealistic strategic proposals, and time constraints caused by competing assumptions between senior policymakers and military planners. In doing so, he provides invaluable insight into challenges that may confront future U.S. war planning and intelligence efforts.
Comments: (3)
Grosho
Tom Donnelly said well, what was the biggest intelligence failure on Iraq? Most would answer, "Failure to find weapons of mass destruction." But far more important, given the long-running counterinsurgency campaign, was the failure to comprehend the nature of Iraqi society and politics. Many of the problems U.S. troops face today stem from the faulty understanding that shaped the original invasion plan.

The enormity of the failure merits scrutiny. Suffice it to say that the fault was general across all agencies of government and almost no one correctly foresaw the shape of post-Saddam Iraq. It will take some time to catalog the full scope of intelligence and policy follies, but Hooker's monograph is a worthy entry.

Hooker had a ringside seat for Operation Iraqi Freedom planning as senior intelligence analyst at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) where he has worked since 1996. This job made him aware that military policy, particularly the Pentagon's desire to fight a fast war in keeping with the theories of military transformation, militated against a deeper understanding of the potential for an Iraqi insurgency. Moreover, the inability to settle on a single war plan--in the two years prior to the invasion, CENTCOM was directed to prepare three separate plans--made for shallow analysis. Finally, the indecisive direction provided by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, euphemistically described as an "iterative" approach, "injected numerous ideas into the [planning] dialogue, many of which were amateurish and unrealistic." As Hooker observes, "Rather than refining the plan in successive operational variants, this process ultimately drove the planners toward increasingly unrealistic assumptions" until they finally paid no attention to Pentagon directives.

Hooker suggests that disconnects between the Pentagon and CENTCOM had an even unhappier result. The squabbles over the invasion plan diverted attention from discussions about the post-invasion plan, the infamous "Phase IV" plan. "Although planners expected violence and civil disorder in Phase IV," writes Hooker, "they generally thought it would be sectarian violence among Iraqis rather than predominantly insurgent violence against coalition forces."

But if Hooker understands the effects of Pentagon shenanigans on military planning, he is on shakier ground when it comes to their causes. He repeats too freely the politically motivated complaints of former intelligence officials whose knowledge of Pentagon planning efforts was indirect and often inaccurate.

But this is a small quibble. Hooker has provided us with important insights into the shambles that was pre-Iraq planning. More needs to be done to tell the full story, but Hooker has limned the most important themes.
Charyoll
On the first table you see as you walk into book stores these days you will find books on how we are losing the war in Iraq and right next to them are the books talking about how great we are doing in Iraq. It reminds me of the pro-Bush, anti-Bush books from just before the election. I wonder if they are by the same authors. Only now, here and there are books coming out that are written by the people actually involved in the operation.

In the case of planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, that responsibility was assigned to CENTCOM (Central Command) headquarters in Tampa, Florida.

This book, written by the senior intelligence analyst for Iraq at CENTCOM describes the planning process, the questions being asked, the intelligence being gathered and the final plan developed for the invasion of Iraq. Obviously he has the advantage of hindsight, but also obviously, the plan worked when it was put into practice by the American and allied forces.

This book provides a fascinating insight into how the planning process actually works within the military.
Felhann
Gregory Hooker was an intelligence analyst at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) who was involved in the planning of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom goes through that process and what the Americans got right and wrong. It is a short, concise and very informative book on how civilians at the Pentagon hindered strategizing for the invasion, and how the military failed to prepare for postwar Iraq.

The first half of the book describes how demands from the Pentagon led the military to draw up three different versions of the Iraq invasion to the detriment of planning. In 2001, when the Bush administration entered office there was an existing war plan for Iraq called OPLAN 1003-98 which was largely based upon the Gulf War with the U.S. having to respond to Saddam invading Kuwait once again. In November 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered a new plan to be drafted based upon the U.S. attacking Iraq. It is the responsibility of regional commands to come up with such ideas so CENTCOM based in Florida was responsible for Iraq strategy. The Defense Department (DOD) made three main demands upon the Central Command. One was to drastically cut the build up time before the invasion when troops, supplies and equipment would be sent to the Middle East. Second, the DOD wanted far fewer troops than the several hundred thousand included in 1003-98. Third, some advocated for Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO), which came up with the slogan shock and awe that believed a quick and small force using high technology equipment could quickly defeat Iraq. These pressures led to three different war plans being drawn up, Generated Start finished in March 2002, Running Started completed in July 2002 and Hybrid in October 2002. Each had a shorter time plan for the war to start and a smaller invasion force. In the end though, the military agreed to starting the air war almost simultaneously with the ground invasion, but otherwise stuck to the original Generated Start plan. That was the only one that was practical to CENTCOM. All the Pentagon officials did was complicate things. The two sides never agreed upon their view of the Iraqi response to the war, which led to the drafting of three strategies. Gregory thought many of the DOD suggestions were “amateurish and unrealistic” because they were made by civilians who had no real conception of military operations. The debate over the war plan also spilled over into the public as high officials in the White House critical of Rumsfeld leaked details of the invasion to the press to try to sway the process. The author thought the pressure coming from the administration was unprecedented and had an overall negative effect because it wasted time on unnecessary scenarios.

Another important insight Gregory provides is why CENTCOM didn’t do a better job planning for postwar Iraq. He admits that the military planners didn’t spend much time thinking about Iraq after the invasion. Relief and reconstruction was considered outside CENTCOM’s prerogatives so wasn’t included. He also believed that the Bush administration was not interested in nation building, that there were conflicts between government agencies likely referring to the fallout between the State and Defense Departments, and the fact that some advocates for the invasion believed that planning for the postwar situation would undermine going to war. Finally, there was no U.S. institution whose duty was to take care of foreign countries after conflicts, which left much of the planning to various different agencies with no unity of effort. This has been highlighted in other books in much more detail that while the U.S. began thinking about postwar Iraq early on, it was done by different offices and was constantly replaced by new groups that started from scratch. The final group, the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was only put together two months before the invasion with little staff and resources. It was given an impossible task, because the military and the Bush administration had done such a bad job on this part of the war.

The last part of the book is about what CENTCOM intelligence officials predicted Iraq would do during the invasion and what actually happened. For instance, they believed that Iraq would not change its deployment of forces with most of its divisions facing Kurdistan, and that proved true. Analysts also thought Iraq would attack Israel like it did during the Gulf War, launch an offensive against the Kurds, and use WMD. None of those happened. They thought sectarian violence would break out after the fall of Saddam and there would be lawlessness, but didn’t see an insurgency. Finally, they thought Baghdad would understand that a war was coming and would act appropriately, but Saddam didn’t take U.S. threats seriously until right before the conflict broke out. These were some of the basic assumptions that went into the invasion planning, and showed that CENTCOM got things right just as much as they did wrong. Gregory was a bit surprised by this outcome since Iraq had been such a focus for America for such a long time. He thought analysts like himself should have gotten more correct.

Overall, Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom is a very important book for understanding how the invasion of Iraq was conceived, and the issues it faced. Some in the Pentagon believed that they knew how to conduct the war, but they were mostly dismissed. The time it took to deal with all of those demands however caused problems for the overall process and a lot of wasted time and effort. Gregory believed that the final invasion could have been done better if the military had been allowed to focus more upon its original concept. He also explained briefly why things went so badly in Iraq after Saddam was deposed. The postwar situation was not considered the responsibility of the military so it largely skipped it. There was no group within the administration to fulfill that task either. It’s also interesting that it was high officials in Washington that tried to stop the Pentagon’s interference in planning by going to the media. Every White House complains about leaks, but it is often times those at the top that are actually talking to the press, and because of their positions they can simply ignore safeguards to stop such practices. At just over 100 pages Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom provides a lot of details in a very compact form to understand the strategizing behind the 2003 invasion.
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